The Iran war, now in its third week, continues to dramatically affect countries bordering Iran and the wider Middle East. The regime has attacked all of its neighbours to the west yet, perhaps surprisingly, has not initiated hostile actions against its eastern flank. One such unaffected country is Iran’s fossil fuel-rich northeastern neighbour in Central Asia, Turkmenistan. Sharing a nearly 1,150-kilometre border with Iran, Turkmenistan maintains pragmatic diplomatic and trade relations with Tehran, centred largely on shared interests in energy and food security. With its capital Ashgabat located a mere 25 kilometres north of the Iranian border, the staunchly neutral and secular Muslim state seeks to mitigate the fallout from Iran’s armed confrontation with the US, Israel, and other regional actors.
Turkmenistan’s Independent Identity
Formerly one of the Soviet Union’s five Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan declared independence in 1991 and adopted a comprehensive neutrality policy in foreign affairs, codified in its constitution and recognised through a special UN resolution. The country prioritised avoiding binding economic and military blocs such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Its foreign policy also sought to limit dependence on any single country and balance relations with global superpowers such as the U.S., Russia, and China, in order to avoid falling into any single sphere of influence.
Ashgabat has applied this neutrality in practice through measures such as refusing to host American military bases even after the 9/11 attacks in neighbouring Afghanistan, reportedly permitting Ashgabat airport to be used only for the refuelling of US non-combat transport aircraft. This stance contrasts with other Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which allowed US deployments on their territory to support operations against the Taliban. Conversely, Turkmenistan has welcomed multilateral non-military partnerships that promote global stability and economic development, seeking to leverage its geographic position and vast natural gas reserves — the fourth largest in the world — for corridors such as the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor linking Asia and Europe and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Domestically, post-Soviet Turkmenistan established a secular state that, while embracing the country’s 91 per cent Sunni Muslim population from a cultural standpoint, prioritised nationalism centred on ethnic Turkmen identity and historical memory predating Islam’s arrival. Founding President Saparmurat Niyazov emphasised Turkmenistan’s kinship with fellow Turkic peoples including Turks, Azeris, and Kazakhs. The state replaced the Cyrillic script used for the Turkmen language with a Latin-based alphabet as a symbolic disengagement from its Russian-dominated past.
State authorities reopened mosques closed during the anti-religious Communist era but maintained strict control over religious life. The government oversees clerical appointments and regulates which Islamic texts may be imported and from which Muslim countries, while restricting religious attire and public expressions of faith. Politically and socially, Niyazov established an authoritarian system centred on an extensive cult of personality that critics accused of mirroring North Korea. The media remains tightly controlled, civil society is effectively banned, and daily life is highly regulated — practices that continue under the current father-and-son leadership of Gurbanguly and Serdar Berdimuhamedow.
Realist, But Cautious Engagement With Iran
Within this foreign policy framework, secular Turkmenistan manages its relationship with the Islamic Republic through pragmatic realpolitik and a principle of mutual non-interference in domestic affairs. Visits by ministers and leaders occur several times each year, reinforcing diplomatic goodwill and practical cooperation. Most recently, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Ashgabat in December 2025, while Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived only hours after the end of the June 2025 war with Israel. The Turkmen government remained silent during the Iranian regime’s suppression of the January protests, while Tehran similarly refrains from commenting on the domestic political situation of its neighbour.
Energy and infrastructure form the core of bilateral cooperation. Turkmenistani gas exports to northeastern Iran supply communities not connected to Iran’s Persian Gulf-based gas network and are particularly vital during the harsh winter months. Turkmenistan also provides electricity to Mashhad, Iran’s second-largest city, located just 50 kilometres from the border. In return, Iran grants landlocked Turkmenistan access to its maritime ports for international imports. In recent years Ashgabat has also signed gas swap agreements allowing Iranian infrastructure to transport Turkmenistani energy to Iraq and Turkey. A cross-border freight railway further connects the two countries as part of a broader Eurasian network linking Turkey and China through Central Asia.
Iran’s main exports to Turkmenistan include petrochemicals, construction materials, and steel. However, food exports — particularly fresh fruit and vegetables, chicken, and cooking oil — carry the greatest implications. Turkmen consumers often prefer these Iranian products because of their perceived higher quality compared with local alternatives. Their availability also helps keep market prices relatively low for the largely impoverished population, reducing one of the few potential sources of public dissatisfaction with the authoritarian government.
Despite the outward display of neighbourly relations, many observers believe the two countries harbour mutual suspicion. Ashgabat reportedly remains wary of the Iranian regime’s ideological commitment to exporting the revolution, which could threaten Turkmenistan’s carefully maintained secular-nationalist Islamic identity. Iran’s leadership is also attentive to its roughly two million ethnic Turkmen citizens, who comprise about 4 per cent of the population and maintain cultural and familial ties with Turkmenistan. Amid prolonged internal turmoil, Iranian authorities worry about Turkmen aspirations for autonomy or alternatively mass flight. Turkmenistan’s pragmatic ties with Israel moreover contrast with Iran’s hostility. Ashgabat established relations shortly after independence and maintains limited trade. A high-profile visit by the Israeli foreign minister in 2023 to Ashgabat saw the opening of a permanent embassy, only a few dozen kilometres from the Iranian border.
ASHGABAT’S WARTIME STANCE AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
Since the war began on 28 February, Turkmenistan’s official reactions express concern over the escalation, reaffirm its neutrality, and call for a diplomatic resolution. Its position aligns with those of the other four Central Asian states, which emphasise international law and the UN Charter as the proper framework for ending the conflict. Notably, these statements avoided explicitly mentioning the US, Israel, or Iran, reflecting Ashgabat’s desire to preserve relations with all sides and avoid direct involvement should hostilities expand.
Turkmenistan also opened additional land crossings with Iran to allow foreign nationals to leave after flights were suspended indefinitely and temporarily relaxed its normally restrictive entry policies so foreigners could transit through the country to Kazakhstan and other destinations. President Berdimuhamedow also dispatched a humanitarian aid convoy organised by a state-run NGO consisting primarily of medical supplies intended for Iranian children.
Despite avoiding direct military involvement, Turkmenistan has suffered more severe consequences from the economic fallout. Within days of the war’s outbreak, Iran halted exports of food, agricultural goods, and industrial products, exacerbating the conflict’s adverse impact on regional supply chains and global trade. For Turkmenistan, the result has been devastating price hikes in basic commodities. The cost of items such as cigarettes, fruit, petrol, fertiliser, and medicines have doubled, and in some cases tripled. Limited infrastructure complicates Turkmenistan’s ability to quickly secure alternative imports from more distant suppliers such as Turkey, Russia, or China, suggesting economic hardship may deepen if the conflict persists.
Both before the war and amid continued degradation of Iran’s military capabilities through air strikes, speculation has circulated regarding a possible ground invasion aimed at overthrowing the Iranian regime. Some pro-regime and anti-US sources have circulated rumours claiming Turkmenistan might allow its territory to be used as a staging ground, while others suggest the Israeli embassy in Ashgabat could serve as a base for intelligence operations. Such a scenario would directly contradict Turkmenistan’s longstanding neutrality and would almost certainly provoke Iranian retaliation. While highly implausible, the continuation of the conflict strains Turkmenistan’s delicate balancing act between regional neighbours and global powers as it attempts to keep the turmoil beyond its borders.