In early March 2026, Lebanon entered a perilous new chapter. The Iran conflict, which began between the United States, Israel, and Iran has now drawn Hezbollah into a war that may threaten its very existence. Because the Lebanon-based Islamist militia is deeply entangled with Tehran’s regional strategy, its leadership faces a hard choice: loyalty versus survival. Recent actions suggest the costs of involvement may outweigh any perceived benefits of staunchly supporting Iran.
Hezbollah’s decision to enter the conflict appears driven more by structural constraints than ideology alone. The killing of its longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024 severely weakened the group, leaving it increasingly dependent on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This reduced the organisation’s operational autonomy and tightened Tehran’s control over its decisions.
Financial pressures have compounded these structural constraints. The collapse of smuggling corridors through Syria following Assad’s fall in late 2024, particularly those linked to the Captagon trade, eliminated a critical revenue source. Hezbollah now relies overwhelmingly on Iranian financial support. These combined political and economic pressures have narrowed the group’s room for manoeuvre, making deeper involvement in the conflict increasingly difficult to avoid.
The crux of Hezbollah’s dilemma is simple: remaining steadfast in loyalty to Iran may satisfy ideological commitments but risks turning the group from a regional player into a casualty of greater powers. Analysts argue that direct involvement in this broader war invites overwhelming retaliation and jeopardises Hezbollah’s future.
Lebanon is still reeling from the 2024 war between Israel and Hezbollah, which caused widespread destruction in Beirut and southern Lebanon and further battered an already fragile economy. In its aftermath, a new government formed after years of political paralysis, raising cautious hopes for stability. For the first time in years, several political figures openly criticised Hezbollah’s autonomous military role, long described as a “state within a state.” The Lebanese Armed Forces even launched a campaign to dismantle Hezbollah’s arms and infrastructure in southern Lebanon.
The latest war threatens to unravel recent progress. Since 1 March, tens of thousands have fled their homes after Israeli airstrikes targeted areas in retaliation for Hezbollah’s rocket and drone attacks on northern Israel. These strikes, launched by Hezbollah in solidarity with Iran following the killing of its Supreme Leader, have produced scenes of destruction reminiscent of the violence from less than two years ago that the Lebanese public still remembers all too well.
Many civilians express resentment. Families forced from their homes, children terrified by renewed air raids, and entire neighbourhoods displaced wonder why they are fighting someone else’s war. One resident of a Hezbollah-dominated area in Beirut told The Guardian: “They don’t care about Lebanon.” Another told The National: “It’s selfish and it’s brutal.” Many Lebanese view Hezbollah’s actions as diverting attention from domestic needs, including economic recovery, infrastructure repair, and effective governance, in pursuit of a regional agenda aligned solely with Iran’s interests.
The backlash has extended to Lebanon’s political institutions. On 2 March, the government moved to outlaw Hezbollah’s military activities, declaring that decisions over war and peace fall solely under state authority. The cabinet directed the judiciary to arrest those involved in rocket attacks on Israel and called on the armed forces to prevent further launches. Even Nabih Berri, Shi’ite Parliament Speaker and leader of Amal, a longtime ally of Hezbollah, endorsed the government’s measures, signalling cracks in Hezbollah’s traditional support base. The cabinet’s response also extended to Iran’s presence in the country. On 5 March, Paul Morcos, the information minister, said members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Lebanon would be arrested, according to Reuters. IRGC military activities would be banned and detainees could be deported. Al Arabiya also reported that the government had ended visa-free entry for Iranians.
For years, Hezbollah operated with impunity, its arms untouched by successive governments fearful of inciting internal conflict. Now, the state has taken the unprecedented step of declaring the group’s military actions illegal, a legislative and symbolic repudiation born of public outrage and fear of further devastation.
Hezbollah’s involvement has also intensified pressures from external actors. Since the group joined the conflict, Israel has carried out targeted killings of its senior officials in central Beirut and has launched a ground incursion in the country’s south. At the same time, diplomatic efforts by regional and global powers stress the need for restraint to prevent a full‑blown regional conflagration.
The group now faces a crisis of legitimacy that may be its most dangerous front yet. Its actions have galvanised public anger, prompted unprecedented political backlash, and deepened humanitarian suffering for ordinary Lebanese. In a country exhausted by instability, the expectation that a militia rooted in foreign allegiance will secure domestic safety is rapidly eroding.
By becoming a proxy for Iran’s war, Hezbollah may have underestimated not just Israel’s response but also Lebanon’s patience. What was once framed as resistance increasingly looks to many Lebanese like a gamble that could cost the country its future, and Hezbollah its survival.